

Introduction to Mathematical Finance

Exercise sheet 11

Exercise 11.1 Consider a financial market with positive prices and i.i.d returns: $X_0^l > 0$ and $X_{k+1}^l = X_k^l R_{k+1}^l$, $l = 1, \dots, d$, $k = 0, \dots, T - 1$, where R_1, \dots, R_T are i.i.d with values in \mathbb{R}_{++}^d . Suppose that the filtration is given by the natural filtration of the stochastic process R , i.e. $\mathbb{F} = (\mathcal{F}_k)_k$ where $\mathcal{F}_k = \sigma(R_j, j \leq k)$.

Consider the utility maximization problem with objective function

$$\mathcal{U}(\vartheta, c) = E \left[\sum_{j=0}^{T-1} U_c(c_j) + U_w(W_T^{v_0, \vartheta, c}) \right]$$

As in Section III.1, we use the parameterization of the above optimization problem in terms of the proportion of time k wealth invested in asset l (denoted π_k^l) and the proportion of time k wealth spent on consumption (denoted γ_k):

$$\begin{aligned} W_{k+1}^{v_0, \pi, \gamma} &= W_k^{v_0, \pi, \gamma} (1 + \pi_k \cdot (R_{k+1} - 1) - \gamma_k) \\ c_k &= \gamma_k W_k^{v_0, \pi, \gamma} \\ \vartheta_{k+1}^l &= \frac{\pi_k^l W_k^{v_0, \pi, \gamma}}{X_k^l} \end{aligned}$$

Recall that $c_T = 0$; so $\gamma_T = 0$.

We thus consider the optimization problem

$$\mathcal{U}(\pi, \gamma) = E \left[\sum_{j=0}^{T-1} U_c(c_j) + U_w(W_T^{v_0, \pi, \gamma}) \right] \quad (1)$$

In the lecture we solved (1) in the case when both the consumption and the final wealth utility functions were given by a power utility: $U_c(x) = U_w(x) = x^\alpha$ for some $\alpha > 0$. In this exercise you are asked to solve (1) in the case when the utility functions are given by the log utility: $U_c(x) = U_w(x) = \log(x)$.

Hint: Use Dynamic Programming Principle

In the fourth equality above, we have used that R_T is independent of \mathcal{F}_{T-1} and π_{T-1} and γ_{T-1} are \mathcal{F}_{T-1} measurable. The random variable R appearing in the definition of C_{T-1} is distributed identically as the i.i.d random variables R_k .

- For a general $0 \leq k \leq T - 1$, if $\sigma_{k+1}(v_{k+1}) = (T - (k + 1) + 1) \log(v_{k+1}) + \sum_{j=k+1}^{T-1} C_j$ for some constants C_j , then:

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma_k(v_k) &= \text{ess sup}_{\pi_k, \gamma_k} \left(\log(\gamma_k v_k) + E \left[\sigma_{k+1} (v_k (1 + \pi_k \cdot (R_{k+1} - 1) - \gamma_k)) \mid \mathcal{F}_k \right] \right) \\
&= \text{ess sup}_{\pi_k, \gamma_k} \left(\log(\gamma_k) + \log(v_k) + \right. \\
&\quad \left. E \left[(T - (k + 1) + 1) \{ \log(v_k) + \log(1 + \pi_k \cdot (R_{k+1} - 1) - \gamma_k) \} + \sum_{j=k+1}^{T-1} C_j \mid \mathcal{F}_k \right] \right) \\
&= (T - k + 1) \log(v_k) + \sum_{j=k+1}^{T-1} C_j \\
&\quad + \text{ess sup}_{\pi_k, \gamma_k} \left(\log(\gamma_k) + (T - k) E \left[\log((1 + \pi_k \cdot (R_{k+1} - 1) - \gamma_k)) \mid \mathcal{F}_k \right] \right) \\
&= (T - k + 1) \log(v_k) + \sum_{j=k+1}^{T-1} C_j \\
&\quad \text{ess sup}_{\pi_k, \gamma_k} \left(\log(\gamma_k) + (T - k) E \left[\log((1 + \pi \cdot (R_{k+1} - 1) - \gamma)) \mid_{\pi=\pi_k, \gamma=\gamma_k} \right] \right) \\
&= (T - k + 1) \log(v_k) + \sum_{j=k}^{T-1} C_j
\end{aligned}$$

where

$$C_k := \sup_{\pi, \gamma} \left(\log(\gamma) + (T - k) E \left[\log(1 + \pi \cdot (R - 1) - \gamma) \right] \right)$$

This proves by induction that for all $0 \leq k \leq T - 1$,

$$\sigma_k(v_k) = (T - k + 1) \log(v_k) + \sum_{j=k}^{T-1} C_j$$

Assume the constants C_k are finite and that there exist maximisers (π_k^*, γ_k^*) (constrained to satisfy $\gamma_k^* \geq 0$ and $1^T \pi_k^* = 1$ for all k). We then expect by the dynamic programming principle (π_k^*, γ_k^*) to be optimal for the original static utility optimization problem (1). Indeed the dynamic programming principle (Proposition III.2.5) tells us that for an optimal solution of (1), $\sigma_k(v_k)$ computed above is equal to the optimal remaining utility at time k . In particular,

$$E[\sigma_0(v_0)] = \mathcal{U}^*$$

is the optimal value of (1). To find the optimal strategy achieving this value \mathcal{U}^* , we first calculate backwards $\sigma_k(v_k)$ and the corresponding optimizers $\pi_k^*(v_k)$ and $\gamma_k^*(v_k)$. In general this backward step gives the optimal strategy *as a function of the current wealth* v_k . To get the optimal strategy we then need to iterate forward starting from the initial wealth v_0 : $W_0 = v_0$ and if W_k is known, set

$$\begin{aligned}
\pi_k^* &= \pi_k^*(W_k) \\
\gamma_k^* &= \gamma_k^*(W_k) \\
W_{k+1} &= W_k (1 + \pi_k^* \cdot (R_{k+1} - 1) - \gamma_k^*)
\end{aligned}$$

However, calculations simplify considerably in our setup, since the optimal γ_k^* and π_k^* do NOT depend on the current wealth v_k (see Remark below).

Remarks

1. Note that the dynamic programming principle only gives a *candidate* solution to (1). To confirm the optimality, one should check the sufficient condition of the Martingale Optimality Principle, i.e. show that $J(\vartheta^*, c^*)$ is a true martingale (where recall that $c_k^* = \gamma_k^* W_k^{v_0, \pi^*, \gamma^*}$ and $\vartheta_{k+1}^{*,l} = \frac{\pi_k^{*,l} W_k^{v_0, \pi^*, \gamma^*}}{X_k^l}$).
2. The (candidate) optimal proportions γ_k^*, π_k^* are deterministic. But there is still trading and stochastic consumption involved because

$$c_k^* = \gamma_k^* W_k^{v_0, \pi^*, \gamma^*}$$

and

$$\vartheta_{k+1}^{*,l} = \frac{\pi_k^{*,l} W_k^{v_0, \pi^*, \gamma^*}}{X_k^l}$$

still depend on the randomly evolving wealth and asset values.

Exercise 11.2 *The goal of the following exercises is to prove Bellman's Theorem for controlled dynamic systems. Questions 2 and 3 describe the basic setup needed for question 4. These results give more precise versions of those in the lecture for controlled dynamic systems and Markov Chains.*

Fix a probability space (Ω, \mathcal{F}, P) and consider a sequence of random variables $(X_n)_n$ taking values in a state space E endowed with a sigma-algebra \mathcal{E} . We suppose that the dynamics of X_n is given by

$$X_{n+1} = \phi_n(X_n, \epsilon_n) \quad (2)$$

where ϵ_n is a sequence of random variables valued in W (with sigma- algebra \mathcal{W}) with the property that ϵ_n is independent of $\sigma(X_0, \epsilon_1, \dots, \epsilon_{n-1})$, and each $\phi_n : E \times W \mapsto E$ is a measurable function. For $x \in E$ and $A \in \mathcal{E}$ we define

$$P_n(x, A) = P(\phi_n(x, \epsilon_n) \in A) \quad (3)$$

Note that each P_n defines a transition kernel on (E, \mathcal{E}) . Indeed,

- $\forall x \in E, A \mapsto P_n(x, A)$ is a probability measure on (E, \mathcal{E}) .
 - $\forall A \in \mathcal{E}, x \mapsto P_n(x, A)$ is measurable.
- (a) Given a sequence (P_n) of transition kernels on (E, \mathcal{E}) , a sequence of random variables (X_n) (valued in E) is called *inhomogeneous Markov Chain* with transition kernels (P_n) , if $\forall A \in \mathcal{E}$ and $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$E[\mathbb{1}_{\{X_{n+1} \in A\}} | \sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n)] = P_n(X_n, A) \quad (4)$$

Show that (X_n) defined by (2) defines an inhomogeneous Markov Chain with transition kernels given by (3).

We now introduce a very important notation: if P is a transition kernel on E and $f : E \mapsto \mathbb{R}_+$ is measurable, then we write for $x \in E$,

$$Pf(x) := \int_E f(y)P(x, dy) \quad (5)$$

Remark: the operator P defines a Feller semigroup. Feller semigroups are a very convenient way to talk about Markov Chains especially in a continuous time setup.

- (b) Show that if (X_n) is an inhomogeneous Markov Chain with transition kernels (P_n) , and $f : E \mapsto \mathbb{R}_+$ is a measurable function, then $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$E[f(X_{n+1})|\sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n)] = P_n f(X_n) \quad (6)$$

Exercise 11.3 (Dynamic systems in discrete time: random controlled dynamic systems, i.e. Markov Decision Processes). We extend the setup of the previous question to allow for controls. We thus suppose that at each time n , the dynamics of the system (X_n) (taking values in (E, \mathcal{E})) can be controlled with a certain control U_n :

$$X_{n+1} = \phi_n(X_n, U_n, \epsilon_n) \quad (7)$$

where ϵ is again a sequence of independent random variables valued in W (with sigma-algebra \mathcal{W}) with the property that ϵ_n is independent of $\sigma(X_0, \epsilon_1, \dots, \epsilon_{n-1})$, and each ϕ_n is a measurable function. We also suppose that the random variable U_n representing the control at time n takes values in (C, \mathcal{C}) and that the process U is adapted to the natural filtration of X (i.e. for all $n \geq 0$, U_n is $\sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n)$ measurable). This last assumption ensures that the control at time n only depends on the information available up to that time. Note that by the factorization lemma of measurable functions, adaptedness of U to the natural filtration of X is equivalent to the existence of a sequence of measurable maps $\eta_n : E^{n+1} \mapsto C$ such that

$$U_n = \eta_n(X_0, \dots, X_n)$$

We call the sequence $\eta = (\eta_n)_n$ a *strategy*. For $x \in E$, $u \in C$, and $A \in \mathcal{E}$, we define

$$P_n^{(u)}(x, A) = P(\phi_n(x, u, \epsilon_n) \in A) \quad (8)$$

Note that each $P_n^{(u)}$ defines a transition kernel on (E, \mathcal{E}) . Indeed,

- $\forall x \in E, A \mapsto P_n^{(u)}(x, A)$ is a probability measure on (E, \mathcal{E}) .
- $\forall A \in \mathcal{E}, x \mapsto P_n^{(u)}(x, A)$ is measurable.

- (a) Show that (X_n) defined by (7) satisfies $\forall A \in \mathcal{E}$ and $n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$E \left[\mathbb{1}_{\{X_{n+1} \in A\}} | \sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n) \right] = P_n^{(U_n)}(X_n, A)$$

Note that we are not in a Markovian setup (as in the last exercise) since U_n can depend not only on X_n but also on the whole history of the process X up to time n .

We call (7) a random controlled dynamic system. The result of the previous sub-question tells us that the conditional law of X_{n+1} given $\sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n)$ is $P_n^{(U_n)}(X_n, \cdot)$. Note that a random controlled dynamic system can thus be defined equivalently by specifying a strategy η and a family of transition kernels $(P_n^{(u)})$ such that $\forall A \in \mathcal{E}$, the map

$$(x, u) \mapsto P_n^{(u)}(x, A)$$

is measurable. Indeed, let $X_0 = x_0$ be fixed, and define recursively X_{n+1} by sampling from $P_n^{(U_n)}(X_n, \cdot)$ where $U_n = \eta_n(X_0, \dots, X_n)$. We will write $E_{x_0}^\eta$ for the expectation under the law of the process (X_n) starting at $X_0 = x_0$ and controlled by the strategy η . Recall from the last exercise, that if P is a transition kernel on E and $f : E \mapsto \mathbb{R}_+$ is measurable, then we write for $x \in E$

$$Pf(x) := \int_E f(y)P(x, dy)$$

(b) Show that for all $f : E \mapsto \mathbb{R}_+$ positive measurable functions, we have $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}$,

$$E_{x_0}^\eta [f(X_{n+1}) | \sigma(X_0 = x_0, \dots, X_n)] = P_n^{(U_n)} f(X_n)$$

where $U_n = \eta_n(X_0, \dots, X_n)$.

Exercise 11.4 (Dynamic Programming: Bellman's Theorem) Consider a random controlled dynamic system starting at $X_0 = x_0$ (see previous exercise). Fix a time horizon N , intermediate cost functions $c_k : E \times C \mapsto \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$ for $k = 0, \dots, N-1$ and a terminal cost function $\gamma : E \mapsto \mathbb{R} \cup \{+\infty\}$. In this exercise we are interested in minimizing the total expected cost

$$E \left[\sum_{k=0}^{N-1} c_k(X_k, U_k) + \gamma(X_N) \right] \quad (9)$$

over the sequence of controls U_0, \dots, U_{N-1} .

We break down this (unconditional) optimization problem into a series of much simpler conditional optimization problems. Define by backwards induction

$$\begin{aligned} O_N(x) &= \gamma(x) \quad \forall x \in E \\ O_n(x) &= \min_{u \in C} \left(c_n(x, u) + (P_n^{(u)} O_{n+1})(x) \right) \quad \forall x \in E \quad n = N-1, \dots, 1, 0 \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

where recall that we have showed in the last exercise that

$$(P_n^{(U)} O_{n+1})(X_n) = E_{x_0}^\eta [O_{n+1}(X_{n+1}) | \sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n)]$$

where η is the strategy corresponding to the controls U .

The goal of this exercise is to show Bellman's Theorem

Theorem 1. Suppose that for all $x \in E$ and $0 \leq n \leq N$, the optimization problem (10) admits a solution and write $u_n^{\min}(x)$ for the minimizer. Moreover suppose that the map $u_n^{\min} : E \mapsto C$ is measurable. Then there exists a strategy η which minimizes (9) and this strategy is given by $\eta^{\min} := (u_n^{\min})_{n=0, \dots, N-1}$. Moreover, for all n , we have

$$O_n(X_n) = \min_{\text{strategy } \eta} E_{x_0}^\eta \left[\sum_{k=n}^{N-1} c_k(X_k, U_k) + \gamma(X_N) | \sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n) \right]$$

In particular,

$$O_0(x_0) = \min_{\text{strategy } \eta} E_{x_0}^\eta \left[\sum_{k=0}^{N-1} c_k(X_k, U_k) + \gamma(X_N) \right]$$

is the optimal value of (9).

To prove this theorem you are asked to show that at all time steps n we have:

(a)

$$O_n(X_n) = E_{x_0}^{\eta^{\min}} \left[\sum_{k=n}^{N-1} c_k(X_k, U_k) + \gamma(X_N) | \sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n) \right]$$

where recall that $\eta^{\min} := (u_n^{\min})_{n=0, \dots, N-1}$.

(b) for all strategy η ,

$$E_{x_0}^{\eta^{\min}} \left[\sum_{k=n}^{N-1} c_k(X_k, U_k) + \gamma(X_N) | \sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n) \right] \leq E_{x_0}^\eta \left[\sum_{k=n}^{N-1} c_k(X_k, U_k) + \gamma(X_N) | \sigma(X_0, \dots, X_n) \right]$$

Hint: Use backwards induction for both questions